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How good is the macaque monkey model of the human brain?
Richard PassinghamMacaque monkeys are widely used in order to understand the
mechanisms of the human brain. But humans have capacities
not found in monkeys, and their brains differ in important ways,
for example in the proportions of different regions and in
microstructure. However, this does not mean that we must
abandon the monkey model, only that wherever possible, we
should test whether generalizations can be made. One strategy
is to use fMRI to visualize activations in humans, and compare
these with activations in monkeys. Where the results are the
same, we can then use information from single unit recording in
those areas to suggest the mechanisms by which those areas
perform their functions in the human brain.
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Introduction
Monkeys have been used for studies of the neural mech-
anisms of cognition for over 70 years [1]. Most of this work
has been carried out on macaque monkeys, though there
are also studies on marmosets, and a few studies on
squirrel monkeys and cebus monkeys. There have been
no such studies on great apes such as the chimpanzee or
the lesser apes, the gibbons. The assumption has been
that studies on monkeys will help us to understand the
human brain. There could be two challenges.
The first accepts that these studies could be helpful but
argues that they are no longer needed. The claim is that
fMRI, MEG, TMS and DTI can now tell us everything
that we need to know about the human brain for the
purposes of cognitive neuroscience. However, this objec-
tion fails to distinguish betweenmethods that record from
or disrupt whole populations of cells and methods that
record from cells one at once or in small populations. The
spatial resolution of imaging methods is adequate if one is
interested in the functions of an area. But if one is
Open access under CC BY license.Current Opinion in Neurobiology 2009, 19:6–11interested in mechanism, that is in how the area does what
it does, there is no alternative to using methods with a
much finer spatial resolution. The reason is that one
needs to know how the different cells interconnect within
a module [2], and how the differential coding of each cell
within a module contributes to the population signal [3].
It is true that in fMRI multivariate techniques can be
used to compare the pattern of activity across voxels in
different tasks [4], but so far they have not significantly
advanced our knowledge of the detailed mechanisms by
which behaviour is coded. Though some progress has
been made with receptive field models and plots of the
tuning curves for individual voxels [5,6], voxels as typi-
cally measured at the moment contain millions of
neurones [7]. The scale allows fine mapping, but it is
much too coarse if we are to understand the underlying
mechanisms.
The objection also assumes that DTI will be able to
provide the detail on anatomical wiring that is provided
by the use of tracers in the macaque brain. The reason
why we need detailed wiring diagrams is that the func-
tions performed by an area are determined both by the
pattern of extrinsic inputs and outputs of that area [8]
and also by intrinsic wiring of that area [9]. DTI can
certainly provide information on the major pathways in
the human brain, but it is unlikely that it will be able to
achieve the level of detail currently available from tracers,
We now have 36 994 connection details on the connec-
tions of the cerebral cortex in the macaque monkey brain
(www.mon-kunden.de/cocomac). And although special-
ized coils can be used to enable diffusion imaging to
visualize the termination of thalamo-cortical inputs
within the cortical layers [10], it is a long way from being
able to visualize the details of intra-cortical wiring.
The second challenge is more serious. This is that the
lines leading to modern monkeys and humans have been
separated for 25 million years [11]. Thus, one would
expect to find significant differences between the brains
of monkeys and humans [12]. Furthermore, there are
very marked behavioural differences [13,14,15], and
these must depend partly on differences in the brain.
For example, humans, but not monkeys, can speak and
use grammar, can reflect on their own mental states and
those of others and can achieve an explicit understanding
of causes in the physical and mental world.
Differences between the human and monkey
brain
We already know some of the specializations of the human
brain that make this possible. They are summarized in awww.sciencedirect.com
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4.8 times the size for a hypothetical monkey of the same
body weight [17]. To put this into perspective, if one
relates the size of the brain to the size of the medulla in
the brain stem, the gap between the human brain and that
of themacaquemonkey is twice as large as thegapbetween
the monkey and a small insectivore such as a shrew [16].
But the human brain is not just a scaled up version of the
monkey brain [18]. The proportions of the human brain
are not those that would be predicted by a plot of the
changes in proportions in other primates as brain size
increases. For example, the neocortex is 35% larger than
predicted for a primate with as large a brain [19]. The
prefrontal cortex, defined as the granular frontal cortex,
forms 28.5% of the neocortex in the human brain but only
11.3% in themacaque brain [20,21]. When related to the
brain as a whole, the frontal polar cortex, area 10, is
proportionately twice as large in the human brain as in
that of the chimpanzee [22]. It is not even clear whether
area 10 in the gibbon is homologous with the dorsal area
10 in the human brain [22], a fortiori for the macaque
monkey.
There are two consequences of an increase in size. The
first is that there is an increase in the number of special-
ized subregions, for example in the visual areas and in
parietal cortex [23,24]. This follows the general trend
within mammals that there are more specialized sensory
areas with increasing size of neocortex, perhaps because
of the necessity to decrease the length of connections
between similar inputs [25]. There is also a principle
within sensory and motor systems that the amount of
tissue devoted to a particular body part relates to the
sophistication of the analysis or control rather than the
size of that part. The amount of information received by
the eye of a monkey and a human does not greatly differ,
and yet the inferior temporal cortex is 12 times larger in
the human brain [26].
The second is that there are consequential changes in the
microstructure. The maximum spine density of layer III
pyramidal neurones in the prefrontal cortex is 70% greater
in the human than in the macaque brain [20]. It is true
that the value for the human brain is what would be
predicted for a primate with a granular frontal cortex that
was as large [20]. But not all the differences in micro-
structure are the result of differences in size. For
example, Buxhoeveden et al. [27] measured the width
of themini-columns and the distance between columns in
area Tpt within Wernicke’s area. In the human brain the
column width is 14–17% larger on the left than the right,
whereas there is no such asymmetry in the columns of the
macaque brain. There are also more magnopyramidal
cells in the left rather than right superior temporal cortex
in the human brain [28], and in the left rather than the
right Broca’s area [29].www.sciencedirect.comThere are other aspects of themicrostructure of the human
brain that cannot be accounted for by differences in size.
Two of these have been discussed in relation to the human
ability to reflect on one’s own thoughts and those of others.
Thefirst is that theparacingulate area32,which is activated
when participants reflect on mental states [30], probably
has nohomologue in themacaquebrain [31].The second is
that there are ‘spindle cells’ or ‘von Economo neurones’ in
the anterior cingulate cortex and anterior insula of the
human but not macaque brain [32].
This is not to claim that these are the only possible
differences between the human and macaque brain.
But those mentioned above are enough to challenge
the macaque monkey model.
The usefulness of the macaque monkey
model
So can the macaque monkey model survive this chal-
lenge? It is illuminating to start with the even more
problematic task of generalizing from the rat brain to
the human brain. The neocortex, with its white matter,
forms just 28% of the brain in the rat, compared with 72%
in the macaque monkey. This might make us very wary of
adopting a rat model of the human brain. Yet, the hippo-
campus is well developed in the rat brain, and it was the
discovery that the rat hippocampus is specialized for
spatial mapping [33] that led to the explanation for the
role of the hippocampus in episodic memory in the
human brain. There is activation in the human hippo-
campus when subjects negotiate their way through space
[34], but also specifically in the left hippocampus when
they recall episodes in their life [35]. The reason is
probably that personal episodes are remembered in their
spatial, as well as their temporal context.Whether animals
have the same experience of recollection when they
remember is unclear, but what is clear is that the human
brain has adapted mechanisms that exist in the rat brain.
The reason is that evolution is opportunistic, as we know
not only from comparative anatomy and embryology but
also from recent comparisons of the coding sequences of
the DNA in different animals. Evolution is a historical
process. It works in two ways. Where something works it
retains it; where novel changes are required, they are
typically made by adapting what was there in the first
place. It is for this reason that the macaque monkey
model can remain productive even in cases where humans
have cognitive abilities that have not developed in other
animals.
Take language, for example. It is controversial to what
extent chimpanzees can be taught the elements of
language. In particular, it is not clear that when chim-
panzees are taught to use symbols, they appreciate that
the aim is to influence the mental states of others, in the
way that is characteristic of humans. But that does notCurrent Opinion in Neurobiology 2009, 19:6–11
8 Cognitive neurosciencemean that the macaque monkey model has nothing to
contribute to the understanding of language. An essential
characteristic of human language is that there is an
arbitrary link between a word and its referent. That link
must be learned because it is different in each particular
language. There are pair coding neurones in the temporal
lobe of macaque monkeys that can code for the learned
association between two stimuli [36]. This is not to argue
that all there is to reference is association, but a mech-
anism for association is still a necessity to allow the
retrieval of a word. Of course, the associations in language
can be cross-modal, as in the link between spoken words
and their referents, but there are also cells in the monkey
brain that can code for cross-modal associations [37].
When Japanese subjects learn the association between
unfamiliar Korean or Thai ideograms and phonemes,
there is activation in the superior temporal sulcus, just
as for intelligible speech [38].
Humans differ frommonkeys not only in being capable of
language but also in being able to reflect on the thoughts
of others. When they do so there is activation in the
paracingulate cortex, area 32 [30]. One’s first thought is
that studying the monkey brain will tell us nothing about
the mechanisms. But it is clear that the anterior cingulate
cortex is involved in social evaluation even in other
animals. Rats with lesions there show a decrease in social
behaviour [39]. It is easier to analyze the reasons with
monkeys, and Rudebeck et al. [40] showed that macaque
monkeys with cingulate lesions show a marked reduction
in their interest in other individuals. The authors suggest
that the anterior cingulate cortex is important for social
valuation. This is not to claim that the monkeys could
infer the mental states of other monkeys, but that they
were less interested in the social signals made by other
monkeys. In understanding the role of the paracingulate
cortex in theory of mind, it may well be fruitful to
understand the mechanisms for social valuation in mon-
keys.
Conclusion
The previous section has deliberately taken difficult
cases. There are, of course, many respects in which
human abilities can be found in monkeys. In these cases
one can give the same tasks to monkeys and human
subjects. Examples are visual conditional tasks
[41,42], spatial working memory tasks [43,44], oddity
tasks [45,46] or visual matching and non-matching rules
[47,48].
Given uncertainty as to whether data on macaques can
be generalized to humans, the strategy should be to
follow up imaging experiments in human subjects by
giving the same tasks to macaque monkeys in the fMRI
scanner [24,49]. This enables us both to interpret the
fMRI signal in relation to electrophysiological signals
and to visualize the similarities and differences betweenCurrent Opinion in Neurobiology 2009, 19:6–11activations in monkeys and humans. Where there are
similarities, one may then be justified in using data from
the recording of single units and field potentials in
monkeys so as to suggest mechanisms in the human
brain. Wherever possible, one should try to confirm the
results by direct recording from cells in patients, as has
been done for recordings in the anterior cingulate cortex
[50,51].
We should also use the fact that we can intervene in
monkey brains to check findings on the human brain. If
A causes B, then removing A should prevent B. To give
one example of our own, measures of effective connec-
tivity in our imaging data suggested changes in the
interactions between areas during learning [41]; and
so we checked whether the changes in covariance were
causal by studying the effect of disconnecting the
relevant areas in macaque monkeys [42]. The tech-
nique of disconnecting areas by crossed asymmetrical
lesions provides an essential analytic tool for studying
interactions that is not available for human subjects [52].
There will always be interventions that are needed if we
are to study mechanisms but which we cannot make in
the human brain: for example, selective depletion of
different transmitters can reveal their contribution to
the workings of specific areas in monkeys [53]. Finally,
wherever possible we should directly compare the ana-
tomical connections in the human and monkey brain
[54,55].
But why bother about monkeys at all? The reason is that
recordings from electrodes in the human brain are always
going to be restricted for ethical and practical reasons. For
example, recordings can be taken for short periods during
surgery for temporal lobe epilepsy [56] and for longer
periods with depth electrodes implanted so as to detect
the source of the seizure onset [57]. In these cases the aim
of the recordings that are made for experimental purposes
is not the clinical well-being of the patient, and there will
always be strict limits to this type of research. However,
recordings can also be taken so as to guide prostheses and
here there is a clear clinical justification. Nonetheless, the
basic work on decoding the activity of populations of
cortical cells has first to be pioneered on macaque mon-
keys [58].
The message is clear. Work on monkeys is essential for
understanding the mechanisms of the brain. But when-
ever possible, one should test whether the results can be
generalized to the human brain. There is nothing out-
landish about this message. After all, Kandel and co-
workers [59] had to check whether the molecular mech-
anisms that they had established for learning in the sea
slug (Aplysia) were also involved in memory in a mammal,
such as the mouse. The gap between macaque monkeys
and humans is of the same order, and we should follow
their example.www.sciencedirect.com
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